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Do Tax Incentives for Investment Work? 
by Murray L. Weidenbaum 
A mythology has developed concerning tax 
incentives for business investment. The litany 
of charges has become predictable-invest-
ment incentives don't work; despite the array of 
incentives, capital spending and employment 
have been stagnant; companies have merely 
used the "tax breaks" to cut their tax bills; in 
fact, the big users of these tax provisions don't 
pay any taxes at all. We hear these charges so 
frequently that they are close to becoming 
adopted as gospel. 
This report analyzes each of those charges 
and shows-to the contrary-that tax incen-
tives have provided substantial benefits to the 
American economy and that the critics have 
underestimated the tax payments of many 
American companies. 
Charge #1. "Corporate capital spending has 
been virtually stagnant since the tax breaks 
were enacted." 1 
Stagnation is not the description that comes 
to mind for a rise in such spending from $395 
billion in 1981 to $4 72 billion in 1985 (in con-
stant 1982 dollars). The reality is that, following 
the 1981-82 recession, the private sector's capi-
tal spending has paced the current recovery in 
the American economy. In its January 1986 
1These and the criticisms that follow are taken 
from Money for Nothing: The Failure of Corporate Tax 
Incentives 1981-84 (Washington, D.C.: Citizens for Tax 
Justice, February 1986). 
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annual report, the Council of Economic 
Advisers described the current situation 
clearly: 
The sector that has uniformly outperformed 
average historical experience is gross private 
domestic investment .... above-average growth 
was recorded for all major categories of private 
domestic fixed investment and was particularly 
prominent for real nonresidential fixed 
investment. 
The CEA's somewhat forbidding term, "non-
residential fixed investment," is how economists 
refer to business capital spending. From the 
recession trough through the end of 1985, real 
nonresidential fixed investment rose 11.3 per-
cent a year. That rate is almost double the 6.4 
percent growth registered in the average expan-
sion since World War II. The growth of real 
nonresidential fixed investment in the current 
recovery has been twice that of personal con-
sumption or real GNP. That is hardly a pattern 
of stagnation on the part of corporate capital 
spending. Figure 1 shows very clearly the 
upward trend in business investment. 
Charge #2. "Corporate Tax Breaks Have 
Failed to Spur Investment ... " 
One of the fundamental fallacies that is 
exposed early in any beginning economics 
course is "post hoc ergo propter hoc." In plain 
English, that says avoid jumping to the conclu-
sion that, just because one event followed 
another event, the first event must have caused 
the second. On reflection, that is fairly obvious. 
All sorts of other factors could have caused the 
second event. A "before and after" analysis is 
just too simpleminded. 
Thus, in measuring the impact of tax policy 
changes made in 1981, the professionally cor-
rect way is not just to look at the next year or 
two. That procedure ignores the recession in 
1981 and 1982. Of course, few companies 
embarked on a rapid expansion in capital 
investment during the depths of the recession 
and their failure to do so is no reflection on the 
effectiveness of the 1981 tax changes. 
Professors of economics-of all political 
persuasions-explain to their students that the 
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correct method for evaluating the impact of a 
change in policy is the "with or without" 
analysis. That is, what would have happened if 
that first event did not occur? This more com-
prehensive approach requires taking into 
account all relevant factors, including changes 
in tax policy as well as interest rates, sales, earn-
ings, capacity utilization, prices, and foreign 
competition. 
There is no need to guess about the results 
from doing a "with or without analysis" of the 
impact of the 1981 tax incentives on business 
investment. Serious studies have been made by 
several outstanding ecnomists. Michael J. 
Baskin, professor of economics at Stanford 
University, performed such an analysis in 1985. 
He reached the following conclusions with 
reference to the 1981 and 1982 tax laws that 
established the system of liberalized deprecia-
tion known as the Accelerated Cost Recovery 
System (ACRS) and made changes in the invest-
ment tax credit (lTC): 
Using alternative methodologies, various 
definitions of the variables, employing sensi-
tivity analyses, and comparing our results to 
those of most other studies, we conclude that the 
incentive effects of ACRS and the extended lTC 
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very likely contributed substantially to net 
investment in the United States in the 1982-84 
period. Our estimates hover around 20% of net 
investment being directly attributable to the 
changes in the investment incentives. 2 
Baskin's overall conclusion that the tax incen-
tives contribute "around 20 percent of net 
investment" demolishes the critics. After 
presenting and examining detailed statistical 
and econometric analyses from a great variety 
of sources, the Baskin report concludes, "We 
believe the preponderance of the evidence sug-
gests that the investment incentives worked, in 
the sense that they stimulated investment 
substantially." 
"The preponderance of the evidence suggests 
that investment incentives worked ... they 
stimulated investment substantially." 
Baskin has lots of distinguished company in 
arriving at that conclusion. For example, Dr. 
John Makin of the American Enterprise 
Institute and Dr. Raymond Sauer of the Uni-
versity of New Mexico show that the investment 
incentives enacted in 1981 strengthened the 
investment expansion underway in 1983 and 
1984. 
Dr. Allen Sinai, chief economist of Shearson 
Lehman Brothers, and his associates reach 
similar conclusions, demonstrating how the 
investment incentives are far more cost-
effective than the alternative of rate reductions. 
They also go on to show that removing such 
targeted incentives as lTC and ACRS-and even 
substituting some reductions of corporate pro-
fits taxes-"should reduce output, lower 
business equipment and plant outlays, lessen 
the associated borrowing, depress employment, 
reduce wages, and cut after-tax corporate pro-
fits in the most capital-intensive sectors and 
2Michael J. Boskin, The Impact of the 1981-82 
Investment Incentives on Business Fixed Investment 
(Washington, D.C.: National Chamber Foundation, 
1985). 
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industries of the U.S. economy:' 
Martin Feldstein of Harvard University, in a 
recent working paper issued by the National 
Bureau of Economic Research, reaches similar 
conclusions. He shows, for example, that enact-
ment of the House of Representatives tax 
reform bill would reduce the investment-to-
GNP ratio by about half of its increase from the 
1979-81 level. 
Three of my colleagues at Washington 
University-Laurence Meyer, Joel Prakken, and 
Chris Varvares-have estimated the detailed 
effects of eliminating the investment tax credit 
and cutting back on accelerated depreciation 
(as the House of Representatives voted to do in 
the tax reform bill it passed in December 1985). 
Such action would, by 1991, lower the gross 
national product by 2.2 percent and raise 
unemployment by 1.1 million, compared with 
the growth and employment that would be 
expected under the current law. 
Charge #3. The "striking failure of tax 
'incentives' to produce more ... jobs .... " 
Some observers complain about the sup-
posed lack of new jobs that were expected to 
accompany the rise in capital spending follow-
ing the enactment of the 1981 tax incentives. But 
the employment resulting from new capital 
investment is extensive. It is not just a matter of 
examining the employment figures for the com-
pany (Corporation A) that makes the capital 
investment. We must also take account of the 
jobs created in the firms building the new fac-
tories (Corporations Band C) and producing the 
new equipment (Corporations D, E, and F)-and 
then we also should examine the employment 
in the manufacturing and service companies (G, 
H, I, J, K, etc.) that use the products that Cor-
poration A makes. 
We can obtain a good first approximation of 
this complete process from overall data on 
employment in the United States. The results 
are extremely positive. In fact, they are the envy 
of the rest of the world; employment in Western 
Europe has been stagnant in recent years while 
job creation in the United States has been 
robust. 
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Since 1981, 8.5 million new jobs have been 
created in this country, with total civilian 
employment in the private sector rising from 
100.4 million in 1981 to 108.9 million in April 
1986 (see Table 1). So much for the allegation of 
"striking failure" to create new jobs. 
The experience of the General Electric Com-
pany provides a good example of the effective-
ness of tax incentives for corpotate investment. 
From the time that the Economic Recovery Tax 
Act went into effect in 1981 until the end of 1985, 
General Electric and its finance subsidiaries 
invested $22 billion in its own plants and in 
other U.S. factories, utilities, airlines, and 
railroads. The company estimates that these 
investments created or preserved at least 
250,000 jobs. Moreover, the investments helped 
to make the company more competitive and to 
achieve a $2.6 billion trade surplus in 1985, a 
year when the United States suffered a mer-
chandise trade deficit of $150 billion. 
Charge #4. Capital-intensive companies 
" ... paid little or nothing in federal income taxes 
over the 1981-84 period." 
The activist organization known as Citizens 
for Tax Justice has circulated a list of 44large 
companies that supposedly paid no federal 
income taxes over the period 1981-84. Indeed, as 
a group, the 44 companies are alleged to have 
received refunds of $2.1 billion from the U.S. 
Treasury. What is the truth of the matter? 
Critics of providing investment incentives for 
businesses underestimate the true size of 
corporate tax burdens in the United States. 
Upon inspection, it turns out that the critics 
omit a major share of the corporate tax 
liabilities of these companies for 1981-84 and 
ignore virtually all of their tax payments during 
that period. 
For example, they purposely omit the entire 
category of deferred taxes, which many 
accounting authorities would seriously ques-
tion. Taking advantage of such ignorance, 
critics of providing investment incentives for 
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Table 1 
EMPLOYMENT TRENDS, 1981-1986 
(in millions) 
Civilian Cumulative 
Year Employment Change 
1981 100.4 
1982 99.5 -0.9 
1983 100.8 +0.4 
1984 105.0 +4.6 
1985 107.2 +6.8 
April 1986 108.9 +8.5 
Source: U.S. Department of Labor 
businesses underestimate the true size of cor-
porate tax burdens in the United States. 
Even if, for the sake of argument, we omit all 
deferred taxes from the calculations, we do not 
come up with anything like the CTJ charge that 
the 44 companies paid no federal income taxes 
at all. Thus, even arbitrarily leaving out the 
entire category of defer·red taxes, we find that 
these same companies actually paid over $1.3 
billion in current Federal taxes for 1981-84. The 
data in Table 2 compare the authoritative 
numbers of Standard and Poor's Compustat 
Services with the CTJ estimates. 
A major factor in explaining the large 
discrepancy between Federal taxes paid and the 
CTJ figures is CTJ's erroneous "adjustments" 
for safe harbor leasing. Safe harbor leasing is 
the term applied to selling of unusable tax 
benefits related to investments in new equip-
ment. (The tax benefits were unusable because 
the firms had insufficient taxable income to off-
set against them.) Most of this activity occurred 
after the enactment of the Economic Recovery 
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Table 2 
CURRENT FEDERAL TAXES PAID BY 
U.S. CORPORATIONS 
Comparison of Compustat Data and CTJ 
Estimates, 1981-84 
Company 
I. ITT 
2. Dow 
3. Ashland 
4. Tesoro 
5. Piedmont 
6. Boeing 
7. Int.Min&Chem 
8. Northrup 
9. IC Industries 
10. Sun Chemical 
II. Mitchell Energy 
I2. Pepsico 
I3. Georgia-Pacific 
I4. Int. Multifoods 
IS. General 
Dynamics 
I6. Weyerhaeuser 
I7. Harris 
I8. Singer 
I9. Santa 
Fe/Southern 
Pacific 
20. Scott Paper 
21. Tenneco 
22. Centex 
23. Southwest Air 
24. Texaco 
25. Union Carbide 
26. Inti. Paper 
27. Greyhound 
28. Allied/Signal 
29. Panhandle 
Eastern 
30. Ogden 
31. Ohio Edison 
32. Northern 
Indiana PSC 
33. Philadelphia 
Elec. 
34. Tysons Foods 
35. Columbia Gas 
36. Jim Walter 
37. Arizona PSC 
38. General 
Electric 
(in millions) 
Compustat CTJ 
Data Estimates Difference 
$3I5.7' 
(180.0) 
(62.0) 
(22.4) 
O.I 
(I3.7) 
2.3 
(46.4) 
Il.3 
(10.4) 
(23.7) 
482.6 
(I8.0) 
(3.2) 
NR 
57.3 
(3.9) 
0.9 
I74.5 
108.4 
(227.0) 
(10.3) 
3.0 
(68.0) 
36.0 
5.3 
67.4 
IJ.Ob 
(63.7) 
21.8< 
252.7 
(I4.6) 
299.0 
20.9 
(I2.9) 
(7 .8) 
35.4 
$(I30.0) 
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($I77.7) 
(180.0) 
(62.0) 
(22.5) 
(25.4) 
(285.0) 
(43.7) 
(46.4) 
(55.4) 
(I0.4) 
(41.1) 
(I35.8) 
(59.0) 
(3.2) 
(103.8) 
(59.1) 
(19.5) 
(11.6) 
(133.4) 
(30.5) 
(166.0) 
(10.2) 
(8.1) 
(68.0) 
(26.0) 
(32.6) 
(10.4) 
(I7.0) 
(28.8) 
(5.6) 
(3I.8) 
(I4.6) 
(30.3) 
(1.0) 
(IS.9) 
(4.1) 
(I4.1) 
$(98.0) 
$493.4 
0.0 
0.0 
0.1 
22 .5 
271.3 
46.0 
0.0 
66.7 
0.0 
I7.4 
6I8.4 
41.0 
0.0 
I03.8 
116.4 
I5.6 
I2.5 
307.9 
138.9 
(61.0) 
(0.1) 
11.1 
0.0 
62.0 
37.9 
77.8 
28.0 
(34.9) 
27.4 
284.5 
(0.0) 
329.3 
21.9 
3.0 
(3.7) 
49.5 
$(32.0) 
Table 2 (continued) 
CURRENT FEDERAL TAXES PAID BY 
U.S. CORPORATIONS 
Comparison of Compustat Data and CTJ 
Estimates, 1981-84 
(in millions) 
Compustat CTJ 
Company Data Estimates Difference 
39. Dupont 
40. Xerox 
41. Pennsylvania 
P&L 
42. Burlington 
Northern 
43. Grumman 
44. Lockheed 
•Excludes 1984 
bExcludes 1983-84 
<1984 only 
(40.0) 
158.7 
177.7 
48.8' 
0.0 
0.0 
$I,332.8 
NR = Not reported 
(40.0) 
(9.2) 
(10.0) 
(1.1) 
0.0 
0.0 
(2,I48.3) 
0.0 
I67.9 
I87.7 
49.9 
0.0 
0.0 
$3,481.1 
Tax Act of 1981 and before the repeal of safe 
harbor leasing by the Tax Equity and Fiscal 
Responsibility Act of 1982. 
In essence, safe harbor leasing allowed cer-
tain companies which invested in new equip-
ment to realize the present value of the related 
tax benefits by selling them to another, more 
profitable company, which would then be 
entitled to claim the tax benefits on its own tax 
return. Obviously, only one party to this 
transaction-namely the buyer-realizes a 
reduction in its tax liability. The seller receives 
some value for this, but it does not represent a 
reduction in its tax liability. 
Unfortunately, CTJ failed to understand the 
nature of these transactions and ended up 
double counting the tax benefits related to 
them. CTJ counted both the buyer and the seller 
as realizing the tax benefits from safe harbor 
leasing. 
To put the matter simply but accurately, if any 
of the companies had made adjustments in 
their reports to the SEC or the IRS similar to the 
9 
ones made in the CT J report, CT J would pro-
bably have lambasted them for "cooking the 
books:· 
If any of the companies criticized by Citizens 
for Tax Justice had made adjustments in their 
financial reports similar to the ones made in 
the CTJ report, CTJ would probably have 
lambasted them for ''cooking the books." 
An inspection of Table 2 is quite enlightening. 
Pepsico, for example, is estimated by CTJ to 
have paid no federal income taxes in 1981-84 and 
supposedly having received net refunds of 
$135.8 million. But according to the Com pus tat 
data, the company paid almost $482.6 million in 
federal income taxes during that period. Ohio 
Edison, supposedly a recipient of $31.8 million 
in refunds, actually paid $252.7 million in 
federal income tax over the period. 
A few of the mistakes in the often-quoted CTJ 
data go the other way. For example, Tenneco 
received refunds (or credits) of $227 million 
rather than $166 million and Panhandle Eastern 
$63.7 million instead of $28.8 million. But, in the 
aggregate, the CTJ "adjustments" missed over 
$3 billion of federal corporate income taxes 
paid during 1981-84. 
Some Final Thoughts 
The critics ignore the fact that the investment 
tax credit and ACRS are only second-best 
substitutes for dealing with the severe 
economic shortcomings of conventional tax 
accounting and for the bias in the tax system 
against saving and investment. It is well known 
that the existing tax system ignores the inroads 
of inflation on capital assets as well as on cor-
porate earnings. But none of the presently con-
sidered tax reform measures would replace the 
archaic historical-cost basis of accounting now 
in use with economic or replacement cost 
accounting. 
10 
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Some critics seem preoccupied with tax 
incentives to business, especially in the area of 
capital formation. Totally ignored is the host of 
government expenditures and credit subsidies 
to promote capital formation and other 
business purposes-the many billions of 
dollars that have been spent for these purposes 
in recent years by the Synthetic Fuels Corpora-
tion, the Corps of Engineers, the Bureau of 
Reclamation, the Small Business Adminis-
tration and by other activities of the Depart-
ments of Commerce, Defense, Energy, Interior, 
and Transportation. 
The attack on tax incentives, in good measure, 
is an assault on the role and importance of the 
private sector in the American economy and 
on the location of economic decisionmaking. 
Perhaps the preoccupation arises because of 
the fundamental but ignored distinction 
between general-purpose tax incentives and 
closely targeted expenditure subsidies for 
capital formation. Under the tax approach, the 
individual business firm takes the initiative in 
selecting an investment project and it incurs the 
bulk of the risk involved. Under the government 
expenditure approach, in striking contrast, a 
federal agency determines which specific 
capital projects are to be financed and the 
government winds up bearing all or most of the 
risk. 
Thus, the attack on tax incentives involves 
more serious questions than appear on the sur-
face. In good measure, it is an assault on the role 
and importance of the private sector in the 
American economy and on the location of 
economic decisionmaking. A reduction in tax 
incentives and an increase in expenditure sub-
sidies would result in an expansion of the direct 
role of the federal government in choosing 
capital investments-and a reduction of private 
risk-bearing. 
Regardless of whether there is a hidden 
agenda behind the tax analyses published by 
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the Citizens for Tax Justice, the fact remains 
that their figures are simply wrong. Basing tax 
policy on such flawed information would be a 
serious mistake and would lead to tax laws that 
discourage economic growth and ultimately 
penalize both workers and consumers. 
12 
t 
